"The Art of the Deal" by Donald J. Trump was published in 1987 and was an immediate success. Trump’s book reached #1 on the New York Times best-seller list and stayed there for 13 weeks. The autobiographical book sets forth the principles of successful negotiation in complex, “deals."
What is a deal? When accompanied by offer, acceptance and legal consideration, it results in a contract if, but only if, there has been a meeting of the minds.
Treaties can be thought of as contracts between sovereign nations. A memorandum of understanding (MOU), is essentially an agreement to agree in the future and usually has no legal significance.
Since at least March 23, 2026, the United States, at the direction of the President, has been negotiating a “deal” with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Recently the negotiations produced an MOU which was accompanied by an agreed ceasefire
Surprisingly, the processes that have been followed in negotiating a “deal” with Iran violate principles of negotiation articulated by President Trump in his book.
One of the cardinal principles set forth in "The Art of the Deal," is the admonition to walk away from any “deal” if the circumstances warrant. According to Trump, one should never appear “desperate” for a deal.
In his book, Trump writes, "the worst thing you can possibly do in a deal is seem desperate to make it. If the counterparty senses you cannot leave the table, you lose all your leverage. You must convince the other side that you are perfectly willing to move on.”
Trump offers good advice. Most successful negotiators would agree.
It is curious then, that when it came to negotiating with Iran in March, President Trump did not follow the advice of author Trump. Instead, he projected the very attitude and demeanor he warned against.
While his rhetoric claimed otherwise, Trump appeared desperate and unwilling to walk away, even in the face of provocations.
Trump threatened to resume hostilities if progress in negotiating a deal was not apparent, and in several instances authorized “proportionate” actions of limited strikes on selected targets, but they were followed by a quick resumption of talks.
Those proportionate strikes did little to change the appearance that Trump was desperate for a deal. That the Iranians sensed this is beyond dispute and verified by both their words and conduct.
The Iranians also appeared desperate, but for reasons that were transparent. Iran was playing for time. They had taken a terrific pounding and needed time to recover, retool and restock, with the aid of their allies, China, Russia and North Korea.
Conventional wisdom suggested the U.S. should have press its advantage and not interrupt its momentum. Victory appeared close at hand.
So why the dichotomy between Trump’s advice and Trump’s actions; between “walking away” and ignoring the obstinance and deceit of the negotiating counterparty.
Wouldn’t Iran’s repeated violations of the agreed ceasefire, not to mention renewed attacks on Gulf allies suggest it was time to “walk away” from the negotiating table?
Under these circumstances doesn’t forging ahead with efforts to “make a deal” appear desperate? Yes, but only if Trump was not acting purposely.
The available evidence points to circumstances that suggest Trump may have been purposeful, not desperate. Why?
Truth be told, Trump needed “time” as much as Iran did. Circumstances dictated that the campaign against Iran be scaled back and that some way be found to open the Strait of Hormuz and thereby restore the flow of oil to the World.
What circumstances? They were three-fold.
First, with China’s threat to “reunite” Taiwan in 2027 looming, the burn rate on the sophisticated munitions being used in the Iran campaign was depleting the U.S. stockpile of heavy ordinance. Not only munitions, but also fuel. Enormous quantities of fuel were being consumed by the air and naval armadas assembled to prosecute the conflict. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) had dropped to a dangerously low point (331 million barrels as of June 19).
Continuing the air campaign in view of the impending munition and petroleum shortages was inconsistent with U.S. national security.
President Trump let the cat out of the bag when he invoked the Defense Production Act (“DPA”) in mid-June.
The DPA is a Korean war era law that grants the president broad emergency authority to command domestic defense industries to ramp up production of such items as munitions, when required by national security.
Additionally, on June 24 Trump summoned executives of munitions and weapons manufacturers to the White House, demanding that they rapidly replenish missile and munition stockpiles depleted by the Iran campaign and other commitments.
There can be little doubt that these steps indicate a concerning shortage of the type of munitions being used in the Iran campaign and which might be required in the Eastern Pacific next year. The meager reserves in the SPR added impetus. The evidence suggests these concerns played a significant role in the decision to pause the campaign.
There were also two economic considerations that must have been carefully considered in reaching a decision to replace the military offensive with a diplomatic offensive.
Facing a midterm election in November that could determine the success or failure of the balance of Trump’s term, it was imperative that the economy be on a glide-path to prosperity.
As the spring progressed it was more and more obvious that just the opposite was happening. Prices at the gas pump were increasing as was inflation. This of course was alarming to the President and his economic and political advisors.
As for the latter, their advice must have paraphrased a truism from the Clinton era: “It’s the economy, stupid!”.
Given these circumstances, what was the best option forward?
A ceasefire was needed to stop the drain on munitions, and the Strait of Hormuz had to be opened to restore the flow of oil and lower the price of fuel and fertilizer. Trump must have calculated that these objectives could best be reached through diplomacy.
A temporary “deal” (the MOU) could be reached accomplishing both objectives by leveraging Iran’s need for a pause in hostilities and for relief from the blockade that was strangling its economy.
Pairing that reality with the needs of the U.S. created a situation ripe for the art of the deal.
What does the future look like?
It's likely the bellicose IRGC representatives at the negotiating table and in Tehran will remain bellicose, occasionally acting out.
Look for “proportionate” retaliation when they do. Unless a formal agreement is reached regarding the points in contention, this pattern will likely go on, at least until November.
Should the IRGC take action which seriously threatens the free flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. response will be more than “proportionate."
For the reasons mentioned, it is imperative that the Strait remain open and oil flow unimpeded. Any action on the part of the IRGC which interferes with that U.S. objective will likely be countered with whatever force, including the use of ground troops, is needed to restore the status quo ante and keep the oil flowing.
Trump has said that, “time is on our side," and indeed it appears to be, but not totally.
The IRGC will be using the pause to improve its ability to fight, but there is no doubt the U.S. can prevail if it has the will to do so.
And, while the U.S. and the IRGC are exchanging tit for tat, the Iranian people may decide to take matters into their own hands.
That would indeed be a happy ending.
Ray Hunkins, a Marine, is a retired country lawyer and cowman. He is a Distinguished Alumnus of the University of Wyoming and its College of Law. In retirement he is an award-winning author.
